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Switzerland and the European Union share common values and have peaceful and 
well functioning economic and political agreements. Nevertheless, the Swiss banking 
secrecy is definitely a thorn in the EU‘s flesh, especially because of tax fraud or 
money laundering. Since the existence of the Swiss banking secrecy it has been 
associated with holocaust money, tax evasion, potentates’ money etc. and also has 
been confronted with espionage attacks by foreign authorities and various other 
disputes. Recent global events have shed light on the Swiss banking secrecy‘s wider 
international agenda. A newly debate about the Swiss banking secrecy started with 
the global economic crisis and the Euro crisis. Finally, not a day goes by where there 
is no report or article in the media regarding the banking secrecy, the Swiss banks 
and its issues concerning the European Union or the United States. This writing 
focuses on the relationship between Switzerland and the European Union which is 
affected by Swiss banking secrecy: By explaining the history and importance of the 
Switzerland as a financial centre, its banking secrecy and the differences to other 
systems, possible issues and conflicts can be outlined. This thesis covers existing 
issues with EU member states. What regulations and restrictions were enforced by the 
Swiss government under pressure from international institutions or the European Union 
towards the Swiss banking secrecy or Swiss law due to international conflicts, issues 
and recommendations will be analysed.
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1. Introduction
The Swiss financial sector is highly important for the Swiss economy. Approximately 
one third of worldwide privately invested foreign assets are being managed or 
administered in Switzerland. Therefore it goes without saying that Switzerland has to 
be aware that its financial centre is not being abused for criminal activities such as 
money laundry or tax fraud. Despite the fact that since the 1990s regulations and law 
enforcement has been improved against money laundering, corruption and any other 
international criminality in connection with private assets, Swiss banks and therefore 
the government are being repeatedly accused of facilitating criminal activity. 
Switzerland and the European Union always have had an special relationship: 
Switzerland a democratic country known for its rural areas, cheese, chocolate, 
watches and its banks – situated in the heart of Europe, connecting the South with the 
North. With its four official languages German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic, it 
boasts a culturally and ethnically diverse demographic. Its relationship to the EU can 
be interpreted from well-functioning to contradictory. Switzerland‘s economy is one of 
the most competitive and stable on a global level. After the United States of America 
and People‘s Republic of China it is the third biggest trading partner of the European 
Union. Switzerland and the EU have a free trade agreement, insurance agreement and 
a so called “Bilateral I agreements“ and “Bilateral II agreements“. The most relevant 
aspects of those two agreements are the free movement of people, that the technical 
barriers to trade have been removed and the entrance to the Shengen/Dublin area.
Although Switzerland and the European Union share common values and have 
peaceful and well functioning economic agreements, the Swiss banking secrecy is 
definitely a highly disputed and considerably unwanted policy from the EU‘s point of 
view: International debates about the policies of the banking secrecy have existed 
since before the First World War. When economic crisis‘ occurred, the Swiss banks 
were targeted to give out sensitive information about their clients. The never-ending 
debate about the banking secrecy relaunched with the global economic crisis in 2008. 
when U.S. investment bank Lehmann Brothers collapsed and the economic crisis hit 
the United States of America badly. At that time, Switzerland‘s biggest bank, the UBS 
was enveloped in a tax fraud scandal. U.S. authorities accused the investment bank 
and wealth management departments of the UBS of helping U.S. clients to transfer 
their assets to Switzerland, hence giving them the opportunity to hide assets from the 
concerned authorities. In particular employees of the UBS helped, even encouraged 
South American and American citizens to put their assets into Swiss bank accounts to 
avoid taxation in their home countries. The authorities postulated that the Swiss 
government and the UBS give out the financial information of its various clients from 
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the United States and South America. U.S. authorities pressured Switzerland‘s 
government into the giving out of previously unobtainable financial information. So the 
UBS investment bank was forced to give out economic information of approximately 
4‘500 bank accounts. The U.S. authorities claimed for more than 24‘000 accounts. The 
UBS paid the United States 780 million U.S. Dollars and agreed on the disclosure of a 
smaller number of account details. In Switzerland this case caused big debate that 
firstly the Swiss government is not sovereign enough and lost credibility, secondly it 
was argued that the Swiss banking secrecy was no longer secure and therefore 
guaranteed. This issue brought the debate of the Swiss banking secrecy also to the 
agenda of the European Union. Furthermore the alleged sale of a CD-Rom containing 
data implicating German nationals having undeclared bank accounts in Switzerland 
and so avoiding taxes in Germany increased pressure on the banking secrecy. 
According to the media the CD was sold from a former Swiss bank employee to the 
German authorities, which caused a wave of financial declarations across Germany. 
Whether the CD existed or not is not entirely clear as its existence has never been 
confirmed nor denied by German government or authorities. 
In virtue of the economic crisis in the EU, Switzerland was considered as a scapegoat 
and also as a reason for the EU‘s bad economy because of the banking secrecy 
which arguably enables EU citizens to avoid paying taxes by putting their assets in 
Swiss bank accounts. One of the main activists against the Swiss Banking Secrecy 
was former Finance Minister of Germany Peer Steinbrück. He wanted to break the 
Swiss banking secrecy. He claimed that Switzerland has to be forced to adapt to EU 
regulations and cooperate in the fight against money laundering and tax fraud. He 
referred to the Swiss as Indians who should be put on the OECD black list. 
Switzerland‘s banking policy and therefore its banking secrecy became increasingly 
pressurised which caused many, especially foreigners to fear consequences from 
their governments for having money on Swiss bank accounts. It led to a money outflow 
from Swiss Banks – people literally preferred having their money under their pillows 
than in a Swiss bank account. At first the global and then the European debate 
regarding Swiss bank secrecy caused a loss of reputation and trust in the financial 
sector of Switzerland and its Banks. The international conflicts caused the government 
to change regulations and improve its legal measures. Despite the fact that the Swiss 
banking centre underwent a reputation crisis and major banks had to face lawsuits 
against international authorities, the Swiss financial sector and therefore its banks 
performed well under the given circumstances in comparison with other financial 
centres and remains as one of the most secure and stable.
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2. Interest of research
The Swiss financial sector has been highly attractive not only for national, but also for 
international clients over the decades. One arguable factor is the Swiss banking 
secrecy and the client confidentiality. However, it has come under national and 
international criticism over the decades; Swiss banks and authorities have often been 
blamed to facilitate money laundering, tax fraud and other criminal actions because of 
the banking secrecy or simply they are given a competitive and economic advantage 
over their European counterparts. This thesis shows the reasons to why the banking 
secrecy to become such a disputed issue. It describes its origins, development and 
implementation into the Swiss constitutional law. The motivation and factors of creating 
a national regulation for banking secrecy will also be discussed. The Swiss-EU 
relations, its bilateral agreements and recent events or conflicts with the United States 
and EU Member States concerning the Swiss banking secrecy will be analysed. The 
main focus of the research is to show how the future idea of the Swiss banking 
secrecy differs within Europe, namely Switzerland and the European Union; how the 
banking secrecy has been affected by the European Union and vice versa. 
Additionally, the discussion as to whether future agreements or consensus can be 
achieved will be outlined.
2.1 Structure
The Swiss financial sector has been highly attractive not only for national, but also for 
international clients over the decades. One arguable factor is the Swiss banking 
secrecy and the client confidentiality. However, it has come under national and 
international criticism over the decades; Swiss banks and authorities have often been 
blamed to facilitate money laundering, tax fraud and other criminal actions because of 
the banking secrecy or simply they are given a competitive and economic advantage 
over their European counterparts. This thesis shows the reasons to why the banking 
secrecy to become such a disputed issue. It describes its origins, development and 
implementation into the Swiss constitutional law. The motivation and factors of creating 
a national regulation for banking secrecy will also be discussed. The Swiss-EU 
relations, its agreements, recent events and conflicts with the EU and the United 
States concerning the Swiss banking secrecy will be analysed. The main focus of the 
research is to show how the future idea of the Swiss banking secrecy differs within 
Europe, namely Switzerland and the European Union; how the banking secrecy has 
been affected by the European Union and vice versa. Additionally, the discussion as 
to whether future agreements or consensus can be achieved will be outlined.
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2.2 Hypotheses & Approach 
The goal of this thesis is to show how the conception of future banking and the idea of 
the Swiss banking secrecy differs between the European Union and Switzerland, and 
how this affects the Swiss-EU relationship. The general idea of the questioning and the 
hypotheses come from a clear position and support of the Swiss banking secrecy. The 
hypotheses state that the concept of the Swiss banking secrecy is often 
misinterpreted and associated in the wrong context. It can be seen as a tradition, a 
piece of Swiss culture which has been implemented into constitutional law. This piece 
of Swiss culture is simply not being respected by the European Union or the United 
States. In addition to that do European Law or the regulations of the member states 
indirectly favour the bank client confidentiality and therefore the Swiss economy. 
Finally, the European Union and in particular certain member states which repeatedly 
try to break or weaken the banking secrecy, violate Swiss sovereignty. In addition to 
that, its attempts do not achieve longterm results but even have the opposite effects. 
The methodology of the thesis relies on qualitative approaches; since the issue of the 
Swiss Banking Secrecy can be hardly measured by quantitative means. Numbers and 
figures for instance of eligible undeclared assets or information of bank accounts are 
not accessible and protected by the bank client confidentiality hence it is highly 
difficult and simply illogical to work with quantitative methods. It does not mean that 
charts, figures and statistics will not be used to find significant results to the 
questioning. Qualitative methods such as a qualitative interview, or an expert interview 
are significant for the result of this writing. Additionally chronological analyses of 
different events and happenings will be taken into account, to clarify the issue 
objectively. In this way the constructed hypotheses can be verified or falsified. To 
summarise, the review of the world literature is the basis for the construction of the 
hypotheses and will finally be tested by the connection of expertise knowledge, 
statistics et cetera.
3. Chronological Analysis of the Swiss Banking Secrecy
3.1 Before the Second World War
From 1910 to 1913, as well as during the First World War, the Swiss financial centre 
was in deep crisis and banks were failing. Within a three year period from 1910 till 
1913, 45 district or regional banks bemoaned losses of 112 million Swiss Francs 
which was at the value of the Swiss state budget in 1912. Other 28 banks merged 
either with a cantonal bank or with a major bank because of the economic situation. 
From 1906 to 1915 85 banking institutions were deregistered. The crisis in the period 
4
before and during World War I which got banks into serious difficulties, caused the 
legislation and implementation of modern banking laws (cf. Vogler 2005: 11). The U.S. 
stock market crash 1929 and shortly after, the banking crisis in 1931, demanded 
further regulations of the banks. From 1926 Swiss banks went through a boom phase 
but on an international comparison with the big financial centres such as New York or 
London, as well as Paris, Frankfurt, Vienna or Amsterdam by that time, Switzerland 
was an insignificant player. Individual British, German and French banks achieved 
approximately the same balance sheet total as more than half of all Swiss banks 
together. The German banking crisis from 1931 affected the major Swiss Banks, which 
were involved in foreign business, negatively. Between 1930 and 1935, the eight major 
banks balance sheet total decreased more than 50% to a total of 4,2 billion Swiss 
Francs. One factor of this negative balance was the so called “bank moratorium“ in 
Germany, where more than 1 billion Swiss Francs were blocked and could not have 
been transferred due to the circumstances of the foreign exchange. Struggling major 
banks, “Bank Leu“ or “Die Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft“ were saved thanks to 
direct financial aid from the state or its shareholders. Nevertheless, banks which were 
highly involved in the German market had to undergo serious financial difficulties. With 
the fiscal- and foreign exchange policies of the National Socialists in Germany, these 
dire straits increased and were not possible to overcome- The “Basler Handelsbank“ 
as well as the “Eidgenössische Bank“ were taken over. In total, 60 banks were 
liquidated or taken over between 1930 and 1939 (cf. Vogler 2005: 12). These 
difficulties which the Swiss banks had to undergo led to the formulation and 
implementation of modern banking laws. The political discussion whether to create 
and manifest modern banking laws became more disputed. Talking of the banking 
secrecy, it is important to note that the banks and its employees already had a so 
called requirement of discretion concerning their clients and their accounts, that 
predated 1915. This kind of secrecy can be seen as an early form of banking secrecy 
which has not been implemented by any law but in fact has been regarded by the 
bank employees as something natural and given. 
In 1922 the the formulation of banking laws were requested by Swiss farmers. After 
the First World War they demanded the implementation of modern banking laws. Their 
principal argument was that the outflow of capital from the major Swiss banks to 
foreign banks would increase the interest rates what would endanger their existence. 
The social democratic party on the other hand, suggested in their initiative of capital 
levy that the war debts could be lowered by a unique conscription of wealth. 
Therefore, all legal entities were obligated to inform the revenue authorities about their 
assets. In other words all monetary institutes had to undergo control measures by the 
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authorities which would have meant the opening of the banking secrecy. The initiative 
caused a capital outflow from Switzerland before the actual vote in 1922. The results 
showed a clear rejection of the initiative. The defeat of the social democratic party‘s 
initiative had a major impact for the future discussion about abandoning the banking 
secrecy – it vanished from the political agenda (cf. Vogler 2005: 17-18). The idea of 
the afore mentioned initiative was actually implemented in various European countries 
after World War I. A tax was introduced which would reduce the debts caused by all 
the expenses of war. Therefore officials were hired to spy and observe citizens of their 
countries. The main goal was to find out whether people had moved their assets to 
foreign countries to avoid the war tax. Swiss bank clerks were offered bribes to make 
them give out internal bank information about relevant clients. Even before the 
National Socialists were in power in Germany, there were various events between 
1931 and 1932 where German officials tried to obtain possession of information over 
German clients, assets and deposits; Arthur Pfau, to name an example, in 1931 
exposed bank clients of the “Schweizerischen Bankgesellschaft“. Pfau was reported 
to the police and deported by the foreign police. When the National Socialist took over 
the government in Germany, they introduced a law in June 1933 that Germans had to 
declare all their foreign assets and eventually face a minimum of three years 
imprisonment if they did not. The introduction of the law to collect the assets of 
enemies of the people and enemies of the state was fundamental to confiscating 
capital from Jewish people and politically oppositional citizens (cf. Vogler 2005: 20). 
The Swiss National Bank as well as the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland 
considered those laws and attempts of espionage as serious violations of the Swiss 
sovereignty (cf. Ladd 2011: 541). Not only disputes with Germany over client 
information occurred but also with France. When in October 1932, two employees of 
the “Basler Handelsbank“ were arrested in Paris while meeting potential French 
clients, they were accused of helping them to avoid the coupon tax. The authorities 
confiscated a list with more than thousand names of French clients. The list included 
prominent names and caused a major domestic debate in France. It was followed by 
a cash outflow from Swiss banks by their French clients for a short period of time. With 
the change of government in 1936 there was a reflux of capital. Nevertheless, the 
incident in Paris barely affected the creation of a banking secrecy law and banking 
law, more the fact that again a major bank – the “Basler Handelsbank“ had gotten into 
serious difficulties. Apart from the “Basler Handelsbank“ another major Swiss bank got 
into a smiliar crisis. The “Schweizerische Volksbank“ was as well a victim of the 
German banking crisis in 1931. It resulted in an involvement of the state in the bank‘s 
cooperative capital to the amount of 100 million Swiss Francs. The state involvement 
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and thus the Swiss taxpayer stakes in the banks meant that the banking system had to 
be under visible and public control. Neither the right-wing or bourgeois parties nor 
banking representatives could longer be in favour of no banking control measures (cf. 
Vogler 2005: 27). In 1934 on the 8th November, the Swiss parliament voted in favour of 
the Federal Banking Act. The two chambers, Council of States as well as the National 
Council agreed on passing the law with one dissenting vote by a count of 119:1. 
Interesting fact is that the banking secrecy is only codified in Article 47 and was 
neither a disputed issue by the commission of experts nor by the parliament. Even the 
social democratic party did not request the elimination of the banking secrecy 
because they did not intend to endanger the complete banking legislation in virtue of 
one article. The whole political spectrum was in agreement about the necessity of a 
banking control authority. Therefore, the crisis of the mentioned Swiss banks gave the 
final push of the political and economic parties involved to agree and pass the Federal 
Banking Act, which came into force on the 1st of March in 1935 (cf. Vogler 2005: 
25-27). The Swiss banking secrecy has very rationalistic origins with Jean-Marie Musy, 
who was Swiss Federal Council and Finance Minister from 1920 to 1934, a political 
supporter and father. It is important to note that the creation and implementation of the 
banking secrecy can not be explained by a minimum of factors. It can not be proven 
that the political side of the agricultural sector had agreed on the introduction of 
banking secrecy laws in exchange for subsidies from banks. As well, the idea of 
implementing the banking secrecy because of humanitarian aspects such as 
protecting the Jewish respectively their assets from the National Socialist regime in 
Germany can not be proven and are considered urban legends. The reasons for 
establishing the laws include repeated bad experience due to missing banking law in 
economically difficult times, as well as increasing espionage attacks by foreign 
governments and officials, finally accelerated by the endangerment of national 
security because of the National Socialists in Germany (cf. Löpfe 2010: 33-35). Even 
before the parliament had agreed to pass the Federal Banking Act in 1934 the 
Banking Secrecy existed as an unwritten law, which the banks relied on for decades. 
The economic crisis in the financial centres in Switzerland and especially the 
espionage forced the banks and authorities to establish a legal framework to ensure 
the security of their clients and their privacy. The main goal of introducing a national 
banking law was to protect the Swiss banks and the Swiss clients against further 
harm. As mentioned before, the Swiss banking secrecy or the bank client 
confidentiality was formulated in only one Article (Article 47) which protects the 
interests of the client and not the interest of the bank. Article 47 had not been further 
discussed or considered critical while passing the law. The Swiss banking secrecy as 
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we know it today was a beside article and was implemented as a law of privacy. 
Political disputes because of the banking secrecy existed already before World War II 
and thus the establishment can not be explained by Nazi atrocities; it can be 
explained by the wide political consent of the political parties, authorities or the 
government to regulate and protect the banks on a national level; the banking secrecy 
itself was a considerably small and undisputed aspect of the Federal Banking Act in 
1934 and codified only in Article 47 1934 (cf. Vogler 2005: 30).
3.2 After Second World War
The Federal Banking Act and thus the banking secrecy came into force in 1935. 
Meaning that by the end of World War II the law had been active for ten years from 
which approximately half fell in the war period. This means that the banking secrecy 
barely could have plaid a significant factor for the attractiveness of the Swiss financial- 
and banking sector, especially at that time. Nevertheless Switzerland and its financial 
centres have been often associated with holocaust money, money laundering, tax 
fraud, tax evasion, etc. and that arguably because of the infamous Swiss banking 
secrecy. The independent Swiss Experts Commission of World War II concluded that 
European citizens transferred their liquid assets to Swiss banks already in the 1920s 
respectively 1930s. Europeans feared inflation, expropriation, political insecurities, war 
etc. Switzerland was a reasonable choice to transfer the assets: The country had 
never been involved in any severe international conflict or war; it has always 
maintained its traditional neutral political position; its geographical position is in the 
heart of Europe and thus the international image of the financial sector was 
considered positive. Since World War II Switzerland kept those positions up to now 
and for a long period of time a process of trust building and finally a credence 
relationship between the Swiss banks and its clients could have been implemented. 
To build such a trustful relationship Vogler differs between primary and secondary 
factors which caused the success of the financial sector and its banks in Switzerland 
(cf. Vogler 2005: 32).
 Primary factors:
 - political stability and legal security
 - stability of the economy as well the currency
 - stability of the banking system
 - free convertibility of the currency
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 Secondary factors:
 - globalisation degree of the economy and the banks
 - banking secrecy
 - experience of the clients
 - professionalism of the service (cf. Vogler 2005: 32)
After World War II the banking secrecy had been established for ten years. The 
uncertainties of war and the economic instability in Europe, especially in Germany and 
France caused people to move their assets to Switzerland for the before mentioned 
reasons. It gave the Swiss banks and its financial sector a good reputation. The 
banking secrecy was a factor which ensured the peoples privacy about their assets 
but whether it plaid a major role is arguable. The following chapter shows how the 
banking secrecy had been implemented into law and how it was adapted on different 
legal basis to this day.
4. Swiss Banking Secrecy
4.1 General Basis
It is accepted that basically all financial centres and its authorities have a banking 
secrecy, basic laws and regulations that protect the individual or client information 
from any third party. The clients data and its transactions are treated as protected 
private information. The significant difference between countries and their banking 
secrecy is the level of client confidentiality. What information is shared with whom 
under varying circumstances. The clauses and regulations under which sensitive 
information is kept or shared and which instances have the right to seek the data, e.g. 
tax authorities, money laundering related authorities etc differs from country to country 
(cf. Aggarwal et al. 2009: 2). The Swiss financial sector or the Swiss banks have the 
tradition of keeping the information about clients assets private. Under no 
circumstance, especially not state influence, can access be allowed to pecuniary 
circumstances of individuals, private organisations or economic enterprises. Except if 
there is a public interest or a higher private interest in case of alleged unlawful actions. 
The assets deposited at the banks, its connected transactions as well as the personal 
information of the clients are legally protected by the banking secrecy. On 
international comparison Switzerland holds a privileged position and because of that 
is often accused of profit mongering and dubious business deals (cf. Mueller 1998: 
15). The inclusion of the banking secrecy in the banking law in 1934 signified that in 
addition to the existing private law professional secrecy, violation would consequence 
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criminal sanction. As previously mentioned was it necessary to create for the 
authorities, as well as the banks, a legal basis on a national level with the purpose of 
protection of clients despite their origins. This was due to the repeated espionage 
incidents towards foreign clients, the international threat and the political and 
economic uncertainties. The banking secrecy which actually should have been named 
bank client confidentiality has been mistakenly associated as preventive measure for 
the prosecution of the Jews. Truth is that it is connected with the implementation of the 
Federal Banking Act which its creation can be clearly explained by political and 
economic events. Many of these events already occurred before the time of National 
Socialist regime in Germany (cf Föllmi 2001: 12).
The banking secrecy as we know it today relies on various articles, not only from the 
Federal Banking Act but also Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks and the 
Swiss Code of Obligations, the Swiss Civil Code and Federal Data Protection Act. The 
protection of the individual privacy is basis for the banking secrecy. Secondary the 
different laws are a public protection against violation of the banking secrecy. The 
following chapter shows how the banking secrecy is constructed and implemented by 
the different Swiss laws and regulations. 
4.2 Legal Basis
4.2.1 Private Law
Touching upon the individual privacy and the banking secrecy; in all western states 
the protection of secrets of an individual is a basic legal aspect and guaranteed. In 
Switzerland this is assured by law of the Swiss Civil Code Article 27 and Article 28 (cf. 
Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch 1907: 6-9), stating that originator of the secret, the 
original entitled person or the initial secret keeper are assured of protection of their 
secrecy. This legal basis is a legal asset for the individual. It is the judge’s task to 
interpret from private law about content and scale of a secret. Should there be 
damage or a violation of the secrecy from a third party involved and with consent of 
the secrecy, the originator of the secret has to be compensated in virtue of Article 41 
of the Swiss Code of Obligations and in addition served satisfaction according to 
Article 49; for auxiliaries the bank is liable, Article 101 (cf. Bundesgesetz betreffend 
die Ergänzung des Schweizerischen Zivi lgesetzbuches (Fünfter Tei l : 
Obligationenrecht) 1911: 27) (cf. Mueller 1998: 60-61).
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4.2.2 The Federal Banking Act
The from the 8th of November 1934 Federal Banking Act is still valid in Federal law of 
Switzerland and called the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks (12.3.2012). The 
banking secrecy itself is codified in Article 47 and quoted in the version of the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority Laws which came into force on the 1st of 
January 2009 (cf. Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen 1934: 30-31):
 
Art. 47
1  Imprisonment of up to three years or fine will be awarded to persons who 
 deliberately:
 a. disclose a secret that is entrusted to him in his capacity as body, 
  employee, appointee, or liquidator of a bank, as body or employee of an 
  audit company or that he has observed in this capacity;
 b. attempts to induce such an infraction of the professional secrecy.
2  Persons acting with negligence will be penalised with a fine of up to 250'000 
 francs.
3  In the case of a repeat within five years of the prior conviction, the fine will amount 
 to 45 day rates at a minimum.
4  The violation of the professional secrecy also punishable after conclusion of the 
 licensed or official responsibilities or the professional exercising duties is 
 punishable.
5  The federal and cantonal provisions on the duty to provide evidence or on the 
 duty to provide information to an authority remain reserved.
6  Prosecution and judgment of offences pursuant to these provisions are incumbent 
 upon the cantons. The general provisions of the Swiss Penal Code are applicable 
 (cf. Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen 2012: 30-31)
Article 47 applies mostly in cases where the protection of private law is not sufficient. 
It occurs especially abroad when secret keeping instances are forced under political 
pressure to reveal involuntarily the secret information. Violation of the Article 47 
includes bank employees, corporate and executive bodies after their professional 
career. Foreign banks situated in Switzerland underlie the same regulations. Therefore, 
the banking secrecy becomes a public duty of bank bodies to protect their 
professional secrecy. It is important to note that the banking secrecy can not be a 
barrier of higher legal interests (cf. Mueller 1998: 66)
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4.2.3 Contract Law 
The general conditions of the banks include explicitly the information that the banks 
commit to their clients to preserve the banking secrecy. It does not change the fact 
that the banks are obliged to keep the banking secrecy even without the explicit 
notation in their general conditions. The concealment by the banks of their client’s 
information is an accessory obligation of the banks; it is based on two different 
articles. Firstly Article 398 (2) of Swiss Code of Obligations which obligates the 
mandated bank to secrecy (cf. Bundesgesetz betreffend die Ergänzung des 
Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht) 1911: 153). 
Secondly Article 27 and 28 of the Swiss Civil Code which stand for the protection of 
the individual rights (cf. Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch 1907: 6-7). In the sense of 
the relationship between the bank and its client, it means that the bank is obligated to 
confidentiality concerning the specifics of the relationship together with the assets 
which both belong to the privacy of an individual. Hence, the banking secrecy is 
under the purview of Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code and included in the secondary 
obligations of the contract law (cf. Emmenegger et al. 2009: 203).
4.2.4 Data Privacy Act 
With the data privacy act which came into force in 1993 the protection of banking 
secrecy reached another dimension; the data privacy act is the more general law but 
sustains the banking law in crucial aspects. Article 12 up to Article 15 contain rules on 
how private individuals have to process personal data. The term of “process“ includes 
the procurement, retention, utilisation, processing, conversion, disclosure, archiving 
and destruction; every individual has a legal entitlement for protection of their personal 
information and data. Article 3 of the data privacy act further diversifies “highly 
protected personal information“ such as religion, race, political activity, criminal 
prosecution or health (cf. Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz 1992: 3). Not included 
in the type of “highly protected personal information“ is data about the personal 
income or wealth and thus in general the financial circumstance (cf. Mueller 1998: 71). 
Banks are considered as private individuals in the data privacy act and hence have to 
process the data of clients according to the data privacy act. Article 6, 10a 12 and 13 
of the data privacy act determine the publication of sensitive personal information and 
are germane for the protection of confidential information of banking-related data of 
clients. Article 6 states that personal information can not be disclosed abroad if the 
identity of the person concerned was seriously endangered (cf. Bundesgesetz über 
den Datenschutz 1992: 3-8). In addition Article 10 determines the premises of the 
process or transfer of personal data to a third party. Article 12 explicates that the 
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disclosure of “highly protected personal information“ or personality profiles to a third 
party would go against law if it can not be based on a permissible justification (cf. 
Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz 1992). Personal data can only be transferred 
from a bank abroad with the explicit consent of the client. Without the consent, the 
bank can only transfer the personal information after rendering the data anonymous or 
process the data within Switzerland (cf Emmenegger et al. 2009: 204). In that sense, 
banks are obligated for functioning organisation dealing with data because of the 
banking secrecy respectively the data privacy act (cf. Mueller 1998: 73).
4.2.5 Supervisory Body
The banking supervision law includes regulatory body to oversee the banking secrecy. 
This aspect the Swiss banking law, in accrodance with Article 3 request that the banks 
have proper organisational structure from its leaders which means that management 
must operate faultlessly in this regard (cf. Bundesgesetz über die Banken und 
Sparkassen 1934: 3). The organisational risk of a violation of the banking secrecy or 
the implementation of these risks, belong to the area of competence of the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). On the other hand the binding 
decision whether Article 47 of the Federal Banking Act is respected or fulfilled and its 
consequences in case of violation in an individual case, fall in the area of competence 
of a criminal judge. Hence, the supervisory body the FINMA, its regulations and 
measures are strengthening the protection of the banking secrecy. Nevertheless, it 
does not provide a direct legal basis for the secrecy protection. In a specific area the 
FINMA has regulated the dissemination of data: if a bank externalises a business 
branch and this consequences a transfer of client data to the external branch the 
bank has to follow specific regulations of the FINMA. These include the keeping of the 
banking secrecy and refer to Article 3 of the Federal Banking Act which state that the 
supervisory body can present their view of the banking secrecy and request from the 
bank to follow the measures of the view of supervisory body, the FINMA (cf. 
Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen 1934: 3). Article 3 itself does not 
provide further legal basis for the protection of the banking secrecy (Emmenegger et 
al. 2009: 205).
4.3 Legal Measures against Criminal Activity
4.3.1 General Regulations
The Swiss banking secrecy and thus the bank client confidentiality which is a more 
suitable term in the way that it protects the client and not the bank, serves to protect 
individual privacy. In any case of criminal abuse, protection of the privacy does not 
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apply. Enquiries of prosecution authorities must be obeyed by the banks. With newly 
introduced definitions of a criminal offence, banks are obligated to disclose data; the 
most recent cases being insider trading in 1988 or money laundering in 1990. The 
Swiss banks are also obliged within the procedures of international administrative and 
legal assistance to provide sensitive data to foreign prosecution authorities (cf. Der 
schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 68-69). The bank client confidentiality does not 
apply in every case, in other words if a client should be involved in any criminal 
activity. In other particular cases banks are obligated to provide information of clients:
 - in civil action suits (e.g. inheritance or divorce),
 - in debt collection or forced liquidation proceedings,
 - in criminal suits (e.g. money laundering, involvement in a criminal
   organisation, theft, tax fraud, blackmail, etc.),
 - proceedings under international administrative and legal assistance (cf. Der 
           schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 69)
Tax fraud is a specific case and is differentiated in the Swiss legal system. Tax evasion 
and tax fraud are legally two different terms, unlike in the European Union. To protect 
individuals the differentiation is made and relies on the concept of self-declaration (cf. 
Föllmi 2001: 13). Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) declares that Switzerland assumes 
every individual citizen having personal responsibility to follow the tax liability towards 
the state and not its bank. The Swiss banks are not obliged to inform the state or the 
tax authorities of the amount of interest which is credited to the clients bank account. 
This definition corresponds to the principles of self-declaration (cf. Perroulaz 2008: 
127). Tax evasion are omissions and errors which occur in individual declarations of 
income and assets and are not considered or do not constitute a criminal act. 
Nonetheless tax evasion can be punished in form of a penalty. The amount of the fine 
is depending on the amount not being declared and will be a multiple of that. If tax 
declaration documents should be forged it is deemed as tax fraud and thus is a 
criminal act subject to criminal prosecution. This differentiation between tax fraud and 
tax evasion was affirmed by a public referendum which in Switzerland was a result of 
direct democracy. The differentiation is also ingrained in Swiss legal tradition. It is 
based on a mutual trust and respect between the Swiss people and the government 
and authorities and is considered an essential feature of Swiss comprehension of state 
governance (cf. Der schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 69-70). 
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In cases with foreign authorities, Switzerland provides mutual legal assistance. Article 
1 of the Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance states the international 
cooperation in criminal actions (cf. Bundesgesetz über internationale Rechtshilfe in 
Strafsachen 1981: 1) In the sense of mutual legal assistance in banking matters, 
assets may be frozen or handed over to the foreign authorities concerned, depending 
on the case information may be exchanged. The Swiss law bases its international 
mutual assistance in criminal activity on the principles of speciality, proportionality and 
most importantly dual criminality. The bank client confidentiality will be lifted as a 
coercive measure by Swiss courts, only in the case where the action of the 
investigation violates laws in both Switzerland and the requesting country (this stated 
the dual criminality rule). Secondly, the proportionality rule which serves to guarantee 
that discretion is exercised in case the proceedings adversely affect a third party or 
individuals which are not directly involved; additionally the assurance that the 
measures sought in conducting the request for assistance are in proportion to the 
crime itself. Last, the speciality rule which determines that any collected information 
through the mutual assistance arrangement can only put to use in criminal 
proceedings if mutual assistance is granted (cf. Der schweizerische Bankensektor 
2010: 70)
Assets which belong to dictators or potentates are assets which were acquired 
illegally by politically exposed persons (PEP), defines the FINMA Anti-Money 
Laundering Ordinance. The money unlawfully obtained in the concerning country is 
often reinvested in the international financial centres. With the money taken out it 
creates a problem for the economic development as well as a reputation problem of 
the Swiss financial centre. Therefore, it is only logical that Swiss government prevents 
that such money is being invested in the banks. Switzerland will provide legal 
assistance in case unlawfully obtained money may have ended up in Swiss banks and 
so facilitate the process of unbureaucratic and effective restitution (cf. Der 
schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 71).
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) a key organisation in the fight against the 
financing terrorist activities as well as money laundering, created in cooperation with 
the banking industry 49 recommendations or international standards of preventative 
measures against the aforementioned issues. The FATF and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are the most important international 
co-ordination departments in the realm of money laundering. Switzerland respects and 
obeys these international standards, is a member of the FATF since 1989 and bases 
their preventative measures on them (cf. Perroulaz 2008: 129-130). Switzerland itself 
passed with the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), giving it its own 
15
regulations on combating money laundering and terrorist financing in the financial 
sector on the 10th of October 1997. It relies on the FATF standards, where Article 1 
respectively Article 2 state that financial intermediaries are obliged to identify assets of 
potentially criminal origin and report such assets to the anti-money laundering agency 
(cf. Bundesgesetz über die Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei und der 
Terrorismusfinanzierung im Finanzsektor: 1997: 1-3). A crucial method for international 
legal assistance is the restitution of potentates‘ assets. Mutual legal assistance is an 
important instrument for combating potentates’ assets. For over 20 years Switzerland 
has addressed the issue of restitution and is the only country which has done so. In 
that period of time, approximately 1.7 billion Swiss Francs (CHF) of frozen, blocked 
assets have been returned to the countries concerned. Nevertheless, there have been 
various cases where legal assistance has become ineffective, especially when the 
governments concerned are not willing or unable to cooperate. The blocked assets of 
Mobutu Sese Seko former president of the Republic of Congo were unblocked by the 
Federal court in July 2009 because of the lapse of time. In December 2008 the Swiss 
Federal Council authorised the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) to 
constitute a bill which should prevent such cases such as the Mobutu‘s. The bill 
should cover the issues of confiscating, collecting and restoring unlawfully obtained 
assets. The law should finally ensure that the assets will be restored and be 
addressed and in the end benefit the people of the countries concerned. The bill‘s 
consultation closed in spring 2010 (cf. Der schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 
69-71). Switzerland committed on an international level for the fight against corruption 
and embezzlement and the restitution of public assets. Switzerland and its 
government has organised international government meetings since 2001 which take 
place in Lausanne. In the meeting key representatives of major financial centres would 
come together with representatives of Eastern and Southern countries to find solutions 
and regulations to enforce restitution of illegal assets. Further cooperations with 
various institutions such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
the World Bank since 2007 and the International Center for Asset Recovery (ICAR) 
from 2006 on concludes the list (cf. schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 69-71).
4.3.2 International Agreements on Tax Regulations
In 2007 the Swiss Parliament passed treaties with Mexico and Brazil in order to 
cooperate in case of criminal actions. Other treaties with Latin American countries are 
either already ratified or being discussed. The government stated that it has not 
planned to extend special agreements to other countries which are in particular 
agreements with the European Union or the United States (cf. Perroulaz 2008: 128). 
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Touching upon the cooperation with the European Union, Switzerland signed two 
Bilateral agreements with the EU. Bilateral I agreements in 1999 and the more recently 
Bilateral II agreements on the 26th of October 2004. The first set of agreements covers 
important political domains such as asylum, culture, environment and security. The 
scope of these domains is extended by Bilateral II agreements and includes further 
economic interests regarding the financial sector, tourism and mutual legal assistance. 
Agreements on combating fraud, capital income taxation as well as the Schengen/
Dublin Agreement are of significant importance to the Swiss financial centre. For 
Switzerland it was the highest priority to keep the bank client confidentiality 
safeguarded under all agreements. The agreement on the taxation of savings income 
between Switzerland and the EU came into force on 1st July 2005. An introduction of a 
system which secures taxes for the EU member states, an automatic exchange of 
information has been implemented by the Swiss government. This system does not 
affect the bank client confidentiality (cf. schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 72). The 
system of securing taxes involves the voluntary declaration of interest payments and 
tax retention. It means that Switzerland provides an effective taxation guarantee for the 
EU; by respecting all savings interest payments made via paying agents in 
Switzerland to individuals liable to pay tax in the EU. The system is also applicable to 
debtors outside the EU and their interest payments. However, it excludes the interest 
payments which have its source in Switzerland and are contingent on Swiss 
withholding tax (cf. schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 72). The agreement on 
taxation of savings income in 2005 also includes an incremental tax rate. It started 
with a rate of 15% which was increased in 2008 until June 2011 to 20%, thereafter to 
35%.If authorised by the beneficiary of the interest payments, in lieu of tax retention in 
Switzerland they can be reported to the tax authorities at the beneficiary’s country of 
residence. (cf. Der schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 72). The agreement with the 
EU on the taxation of savings income forced the Swiss banks to make great efforts 
and caused them substantial costs in order to fulfil the requirements and implement all 
necessary adjustments by a given time. The amount of gross revenue from Swiss 
withholding tax on savings income of individuals which are taxable in the EU was CHF 
738.4 million in 2008. 25% of this revenue  was retained by Switzerland to cover the 
expenses. The majority and thus 75% is directly going to the EU and is paid to the EU 
member states. In 2008, approximately 43‘000  savings income declarations were 
voluntarily made. With the goal to close certain loopholes the EU is currently revising 
the regulations and guidelines on savings income taxation. The target is to revise the 
field of life insurance and structured products, investment funds and the taxation of 
securities-like claims, which so far have not been considered in taxation. The usage of 
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a legal entity as an intermediary as well should no longer be possible for private 
individuals. On the other hand, during renegotiations between Switzerland and the EU 
will the Swiss Bankers Association demand a reduction of the current maximum tax 
rate of 35% (cf. Der schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 72). In June 2005, the Swiss 
people had agreed to join the Schengen/Dublin area. The agreements included a 
reduction of border control and the continuing and closer cooperation in asylum 
legislation and police work. For the banking sector the agreements are only relevant in 
legal assistance in criminal cases. Since the Schengen/Dublin is a dynamic 
agreement, Switzerland has maintained an opt out clause in case of an extension of 
legal assistance provisions which apply to direct taxation. It means that Switzerland 
does not have to follow newly implemented provisions concerning direct taxation and 
still remain a party of the agreement. A part of the Bilateral II agreement is the 
agreement on combating fraud. It has been implemented in Switzerland since April 
2008 although not all EU member states have adopted it. The agreement serves the 
further administrative and legal assistance in indirect taxation matters, such as tax 
fraud or serious tax evasion. Switzerland has granted the EU authorities the same 
instruments as in domestic proceedings. Those measures (hearing of witnesses, 
inspection of bank accounts, house searches) apply not only for tax fraud but also for 
tax evasion. In order for a premise to be searched a judicial search warrant is needed. 
In addition to that, the amount of the offence must be larger than 25‘000 Euros. This 
only applies for indirect taxation. The principle of speciality remains that in direct 
taxation proceedings, the information gathered because of the legal assistance 
arrangement can not be used (cf. Der schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 73). The 
Swiss government has recently signed an agreement with Germany, Great Britain and 
Austria on the revision and the renewal of their tax agreements. Other revised 
agreements with Italy or France can be expected in the near future. The concept of 
the revised tax agreement was approved by the Economic Commission of the Council 
of States of Switzerland on the 15th of May 2012. Also approved were the international 
regulation on withholding tax, which regulate the enforcement and implementation of 
the agreements within Switzerland. However, the Commission explicitly postulated that 
foreign authorities are not entitled to do any examination or investigations, which was 
decided unanimously. The agreements and the law have to be approved by the 
chambers of the Swiss parliament as well as the parliaments of the respective 
countries. The Swiss Federal Council sees the agreements as alternative to an 
automatic exchange of information of client information. With the agreements, the 
foreign tax authorities would receive the amount of tax they are entitled to, without the 
bank client confidentiality being affected. If all, the domestic and foreign parliaments 
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approve the agreements, undeclared assets and future income from capital 
investments of British, Austrian and German clients will be taxed at a flat-rate. These 
lump sum amounts will be anonymously transferred to the foreign authorities. The 
agreements propose different tax rates for the three countries according the 
respective taxation systems, for Great Britain and Germany 21-41%, for Austria 
15-38%. Taxation rate for future income from capital investments amounts for Austria 
25%, Germany 26,375% and ranges for Great Britain from 27 to 48%. The agreements 
go into effect on the 1st of January 2013 (cf. Tax Agreements I 2012).
Another agreement which Switzerland is having with 73 countries, including all major 
industrialised states, is the double taxation agreements (DTA). This is to prevent 
double taxation, meaning that income and assets are not being taxed in two different 
countries. This principle applies for private individuals with different domiciles in 
different countries or companies which are situated in more than one country (cf. Der 
schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 73). With Switzerland being a founding member 
of the OECD it follows the international standards and participates in the agenda of 
the OECD covering financial markets, economic policies, structural policy, health and 
tax. In tax matters, the OECD sets the worldwide standards, guidelines and 
regulations. The OECD proposes to its 30 member states a model for double taxation 
agreements. The model should neither be applicable law nor effective law, it is simply 
a template which different countries can base their international agreements on. The 
template contains 31 Articles which regulate certain taxation issues (cf. Perroulaz 
2008: 130-132). Article 26 of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
discusses the regulation of  mutual assistance in exchanging information between the 
tax authorities of the concerned contracting states (OECD 2010). The Federal Council 
decided on May 13th 2009 to adapt the Article 26 of the OECD model and its 
regulation on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters. Mutual assistance in tax 
matters was from then on guaranteed by the Swiss authorities, not only in tax fraud but 
also in tax evasion cases. To implement the Federal Council‘s decision, the DTA have 
been adjusted to the certain standards. With the introduction of Article 26 there was 
no change for the bank client confidentiality hence was not affected. The DTA with 
countries which have been adjusted to the OECD standard respectively with Article 
26, Switzerland provides an exchange of information only upon request and not 
automatically. Administrative assistance is only provided if certain conditions are 
fulfilled (cf. schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 74):
the foreign tax authority has to submit a request in writing, stating an adequately 
reasonable suspicion;
19
 the request must include a specific reference to the identity of the person liable to tax;
the facts of the tax evasion case have to be adequately described;
the bank or branch concerned has to be specified (cf. Der schweizerische 
Bankensektor 2010: 74).
Should the individual liable to tax, disagree with the decision to provide administrative 
assistance, there is the possibility to file a complaint to the Federal Administrative 
Court (cf. Der schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 74).
4.3.3 Combating Money Laundering
Over the past years, Swiss authorities have implemented different preventive 
measures to fight money laundering and organised crime. On one side the 
government has implemented regulations and institutions, the Federal Act on the 
Prevention of Money Laundering in the Financial Sector which came into force on the 
1st April 1998. Second the Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance of the Swiss Financial 
Markets Supervisory Authority (AMLO FINMA) and last Swiss Penal Code (SPC). On 
the other side are the banking institutions; it is in the banks own interest to ensure their 
services not being abused or misused. The Agreement on the Swiss bank‘s code of 
conduct with regard to the exercise of due diligence (CDB) discusses the banks‘ self-
regulation and plays significant part in the fight against money laundering. The Anti-
Money Laundering Act (AMLA) is relevant to all financial intermediaries who accept 
assets from a third party for instance banks, insurance companies, attorneys, wealth 
managers, fund managers, property managers, securities traders et cetera. The 
AMLA is based on the former Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) Anti-Money 
Laundering Ordinance and the CDB; its implementation is founded on self-regulation 
and direct public supervision by the AMLO FINMA. It obligates all financial 
intermediaries to register every case of justified suspicion of money laundering to a 
federal control authority. Money brokers, trustees, finance companies and wealth 
managers so far have not been publicly supervised thus have united themselves to 
self-regulatory associations. Comparably with the CDB for banks these associations 
had to create regulations which could meet the legal requirements (cf. Der 
schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 75). In 2003 the Anti-Money Laundering 
Ordinance of the SFBC came into force which is today known as FINMA. The 
ordinance was revised in 2008 to meet not only the standards the FATF, but also the 9 
special recommendations against financing of terrorist activities. Guidelines against 
assets belonging to politically exposed persons and money laundering have been 
tightened and extended with the area of financing of terrorist activities. A systematic 
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and electronic global monitoring of high-risk business relationships is demanded by 
the Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance of the SFBC and the FINMA (cf. Der 
schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 75). Under the terms of Article 305bis of the SPC, 
“punitive measures for any action designed to obstruct investigations into the origin or 
location, or prevent the confiscation of assets, if such assets are known or must be 
assumed to be proceeds from a crime“ (cf. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch 1937: 
120). “Professional financial intermediaries are statutorily obliged to apply the “know-
your-customer” principle. Insufficient identity verification of a contracting partner or 
beneficial owner is deemed an offence“ and “financial institutions are allowed to report 
to authorities any observations leading to the conclusion that assets originate from a 
crime. Such reporting does not constitute a violation of bank client confidentiality“ 
states Article 305ter (cf. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch 1937: 121). Articles 322ter 
up to 322octies name the penal provisions for corruption. Strictly punished is the act 
of active or passive bribery among Swiss officials as well as the preferential treatment 
because of offering or accepting a bribe from foreign or domestic officials (cf. 
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch 1937: 128-139). 
Talking of the self-regulation of banks, the agreement on the code of conduct 
regarding the exercise of due diligence (CDB) plays an important role combating 
money laundering. The CDB came into force in 1977, long before the AMLA and 
before the inclusion of relevant provisions in the SPC. In five-year intervals the CDB is 
revised, last in 2008. The CDB‘s core elements are the duty of financial intermediaries 
to verify the identity of their contracting partner or the beneficial owner. The details of 
the CDB determine how to proceed the identification and what documents have to be 
examined. Other core elements of the CBD are the prohibition to assist or help in the 
flight of assets from countries where it is restricted to place cross-border investments 
and the prohibition of banks to assist actively in tax evasion or similar actions by 
issuing incomplete statements. The FINMA, as well as the banks mandate statutory 
bank auditors to control the compliance with the CDB. Possible violations against the 
CDB are being judged by the independent CDB supervisory body as well as 
designated inspectors. Fines up to a maximum of CHF 10 million can be imposed. The 
fines cover the expenses. The remaining amount is donated to Red Cross (cf. Der 
schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 76). Non-Governmental Organisations often 
accuse Switzerland and its banks of allegedly manage large amounts of illegal flight 
capital from developing countries. There have been cases where Swiss banks have 
been beneficiary of flight capital but in those cases, there has always been the effort 
to return the money to the concerned countries. In addition to that those accusations 
are often based on non-existing or unreliable statistics (cf. Chaikin 2005: 106).
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Last but not least the significant role of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The 
FATF includes 35 nations from which Switzerland is one of its founding members since 
1989. At that time the FATF was created to give an overview of international anti-
money laundering cooperation forms and work on measures against the issue of 
money laundering. The main goal of the FATF today is to combat money laundering by 
establishing international standards and guidelines to prevent money laundering and 
financing of terrorist activities. Therefore, the FATF monitors its member states at 
regular intervals whether they meet 40 recommendations and 9 special 
recommendations or the status of implementation of the recommendations. The 40 
recommendations have been revised in 2003 in order to cover new forms of crime in 
the areas of financing terrorism and money laundering. The catalogue of measures 
has been repeatedly expanded in the area of financial and stock exchange offences 
that may predicate money laundering. In April 2005 Switzerland has been reviewed for 
the third time after 2001 and 2004. The review resulted positively. The FATF has 
acknowledged Switzerland‘s leading role in the fight against money laundering. It is 
important to note that first FATF‘s recommendations were based on the CDB. After 
their revision in 2003 the Swiss Federal Council announced to adapt Swiss legislation 
to fulfil the FATF‘s recommendations. In 2005 the draft of the Federal Council 
expanded the range of predicative crimes to money laundering and extended the 
group of entities that are subject to the AMLA. In addition should the need for 
exchange of data among authorities that are involved in fighting money be addressed 
in the AMLA. Further the draft proposed to holders of bearer shares to disclose their 
shares to the respective companies. The proposal was criticised by the Swiss Bankers 
Association and generally by the financial centre as a whole. As a result a more 
moderated version of the AMLA detailed which came into force on the 1st of February 
2009. The revised version of the AMLA has been approved by the FATF although 
certain aspects regarding the transparency with regard to bearer shares and the 
implementation of international standards for blocking assets generated through 
terrorist activities and the effectiveness of the reporting system for suspicious activities 
have been criticised. Since the review in 2005 by FATF the international supervision of 
Switzerland has terminated because of reaching the 3rd cycle of the worldwide 
evaluation process. It means for the future that Switzerland is one of the first countries 
which is being evaluated in a two year interval in a simplified procedure along with 
Italy, Great Britain and Norway (cf. schweizerische Bankensektor 2010: 77).
22
4.4 Ethical Aspects of the Banking Secrecy / International Conflicts
It is clear that the Swiss banking secrecy creates various moral and ethical grey areas. 
Generally speaking, the most relevant cases are regarding tax fraud or tax evasion, 
money laundering, managing of potentates‘ assets et cetera. To repeat Swiss law 
differentiates tax fraud and tax evasion and thus does not assist in every request of 
information exchange by foreign authorities. It is argued that more than a third 
(30-40%) of all offshore invested assets are being managed in Switzerland which is 
estimated CHF 4000 billion. Statistical projections claim that approximately 70-90% of 
those assets are not declared in their domestic countries and hence not taxed (cf. 
VBG Institut 2006: 3). For retaining of dormant assets, in case of Holocaust Money or 
the theft and administration of state capital or potentates‘ money of developing 
countries, Swiss authorities and banking institutes have often been blamed. In the 
previous chapters certain issues have been outlined (see Chapter 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). This 
subchapter will focus on ethical grey areas by presenting different facts and positions 
which occurred during international conflicts between Swiss banks, authorities and 
other jurisdictions, namely the European Union, the United States, developing 
countries or victims of the Holocaust. Ethical grey areas occurred on micro, meso as 
well as on macro level. The end of this chapter gives an overview of moral and ethical 
aspects of the Swiss banking secrecy and its polemics.
4.4.1 United States vs. UBS
The homo economicus,  the concept of rational, self-interested and selfish individuals 
which base their decisions on maximising economic benefits for themselves applies in 
the following case on the micro level. (cf. Gaus 2008: 19). There is moral conflict of 
bank employees; bank employees often get a percentage of the clients‘ assets they 
acquire. So it occurred in the United States in 2008 that employees of the largest bank 
in Switzerland the UBS, not only encouraged and also helped U.S. clients to transfer 
their assets to offshore bank accounts of the UBS in Switzerland to bypass the status 
of a Qualified Intermediary (QI) which is a direct agreement between the U.S. and the 
banks to exchange and report information of the clients to the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). So basically, the UBS helped American citizens in tax evasion matters 
(cf. Missbach 2009: 116). The UBS tax fraud case started in 2007, when Igor Olenicoff 
was found guilty of criminal tax fraud in connection with offshore bank accounts 
managed by a UBS private banker. The information which was obtained by Bradley 
Birkenfeld, the former UBS private banker, the IRS started to build a case. After 
various arrests and hearings of UBS executives in the United States, the IRS filed a 
claim directly to the UBS to disclose all information of approximately 52‘000 American 
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citizens with undeclared assets in Switzerland (cf. Bondi 2010: 7-9). The UBS refused 
to comply. They argued that according to the DTA the U.S. authorities had to address 
their request of information exchange directly to the Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
(FTA). Since the information was within Switzerland‘s sovereign territory, authorisation 
and assistance had to be granted by Swiss officials. After one year of diplomatic and 
legal disputes the Swiss government signed in 2009 a Revised Tax Treaty with the 
United States. In September 2009, Switzerland and the United States agreed on the 
Double Taxation Amendment. Since the DTA, at that time, did not necessarily include 
or limit the exchange of information in the terms of tax fraud or tax evasion, the Double 
Taxation Amendment states that the tax authorities from both United States and 
Switzerland may exchange such relevant information in order to enforce and 
administer domestic laws of the two parties. Therefore, the types of cases which are 
eligible for mutual assistance in sharing information from the competent governmental 
authorities have been broadened to include tax fraud and tax evasion (cf. Victorson 
2011: 833). If the U.S. should request information from the Swiss authorities to enforce 
American tax laws following premises must be fulfilled according to Article 4 of Double 
Taxation Amendment: 
- “information such as a name, address, account number or similar identifying 
information of the person allegedly violating the U.S. tax laws (i); 
- the period of time for which the information is requested (ii);
- a statement of the information sought including its nature and the form in which 
the
- requesting State wishes to receive the information from the requested State (iii);
- the tax purpose for which the information is sought; and (iv);
- the name and, to the extent known, the address of any person believed to be in 
possession of the requested information (v).“ (cf Protokoll zur Änderung des 
Abkommens zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und den 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika zur Vermeidung der Doppelbesteuerung auf 
dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen 2009: 5). 
“The purpose of referring to information that may be relevant is intended to provide for 
exchange of information in tax matters to the widest possible extent without allowing 
the Contracting States to engage in “fishing expeditions” or to request information that 
is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer“ (cf. (cf Protokoll zur 
Änderung des Abkommens zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und 
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den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika zur Vermeidung der Doppelbesteuerung auf 
dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen 2009: 6).
The UBS on the other hand admitted to have helped U.S. clients to avoid taxation and 
agreed on paying a fine of 780 million U.S. Dollars, disclose the information of 4‘450 
account holders and cease its offshore banking activities in the United States (cf. 
Victorson 2011: 832-833). The example UBS vs. the United States shows various 
aspects which are morally reprehensible. On a micro level, employees encouraged 
American citizens to break the lawin their domestic country for the eomployees own 
benefit. They did not only put their clients to danger but also caused major reputation 
loss to their bank, the UBS and the Swiss financial centre. So there is also the ethical 
conflict for financial intermediaries. Generally speaking, individuals use the banking 
secrecy to either promote offshore banking or for their own benefits or either hide their 
assets to avoid paying taxes, so basically dishonest and greedy bankers as well as 
clients (cf. Chaikin 2005: 103). On a meso and corporate leve,l the bank itself chose 
the strategy to blame the individual bank employees for the damage they caused to 
the IRS and the UBS. Last on a macro level where the Swiss government who had 
their own financial interests, evident in the allowence the data transfer. Since the UBS 
underwent a major crisis; the Swiss government bought 9% of shares in order to 
prevent the bank‘s collapse. So it was in the governments interest to find a fast as 
possible agreement with U.S. authorities so that the stock price of the UBS would 
stabilise. After the settlement the government sold the shares for a profit (cf. Bondi 
2010: 12).
4.4.2 European Union, Tax Fraud & Tax Evasion
Another important case is the relationship between Switzerland and the EU or its 
member states. Over the past years accusations have been made against the Swiss 
banks and the banking secrecy by EU member states. The bank client confidentiality 
implemented in Austria, Liechtenstein or Switzerland give the possibility to EU clients 
to avoid paying taxes in their domestic countries which obviously favours the rich. 
With tax evasion in Switzerland, primarily the neighbouring countries are negatively 
affected, since Switzerland is situated in the heart of Europe. In 2001 the French 
parliamentary delegation estimated the percentage of illegal assets in Switzerland to 
90% (cf. Assemblée National, 2001: 32). The “Deutsche Bank“ assumes 70% (cf. 
Missbach 2009: 103). The following charts show the percentage which the KPMG 
have estimated.
25
Chart 1 shows that approximately 880 billion Swiss Francs from EU clients is alleged 
to be illegally in Switzerland. In Chart 2 the estimations display that out of those CHF 
880 billion, German, Italian and French clients have allegedly the largest undeclared 
amounts of assets in Switzerland. The “Banca d‘Italia“ figures that illegally foreign 
invested money by Italians is amounted to 500 billion Euros. In 2009 Italy launched a 
tax amnesty programme which allowed Italian citizens to legally declare their assets 
from abroad for a compensation tax fee of 5%. The tax amnesty caused an inflow of 
70 billion Euros. Nearly 45% (25-30 billion Euros) was administered on Swiss bank 
accounts. Total tax revenue for Italian tax authorities in virtue of the tax amnesty 
programme amounted 5 billion Euros (cf. Victorson 2011: 846-847). One could argue 
that according to the statistics of the tax amnesty, 45% of the estimated amount which 
has not been repatriated may be administered by Swiss banks also. It would mean 
that approximately other 230 billion Euros are placed on Swiss bank accounts. The 
German Federal Ministry of Finance recently claimed that more than 500 billion Euros 
of illegal German assets are put in banks either in Switzerland, Liechtenstein or 
Luxembourg. The EU Commission stated in 2006 that because of tax fraud, the EU 
annually misses out tax revenues amounting to 200-250 billion Euros (cf. Missbach 
2009: 104). The different amounts of the estimations made by various authorities or 
instances show clearly those numbers are simply assumptions and financial 
projections, certainly not empirical data. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that there are 
foreign clients which have placed their assets in Swiss banks to avoid taxes. 
In the cases of tax fraud and tax evasion Switzerland has signed various agreements 
and made different efforts to cooperate with international authorities. Still, the Swiss 
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fiscal policy can be criticised for ethical reasons, especially for its tax practices with 
foreign assets. Switzerland does not tolerate autonomous interfering or structuring of 
the respective foreign countries with these assets, therefore attracts tax evaders. It is 
clear that the use of banking secrecy practices is severely criticised by foreign 
officials which is based on ideological and moral aspects, for that reason opinions on 
the banking secrecy are rather subjective. Additionally, there is simply no instance 
which can prohibit those practices. It means that all the dialogue and dispute about 
the banking secrecy is highly affected by crisis‘. Crisis which leads people to rethink 
and creates conflict potential between countries because of different policies. It is 
important to note that in Europe the individual state is autonomous and thus want to 
demonstrate its sovereignty, especially in crisis (cf. World Justice Forum Foundation 
(WJF) 2009: 21). The reason for the conflict between Switzerland and the EU, 
especially with the neighbouring countries Germany, France and Italy is the subject of 
taxation. It is a violation of law when EU citizen avoids paying taxes in their respective 
country. It is violation of Swiss law to actively or passively help in tax evasion as a 
financial intermediary. The question arises whether it is the duty of the Swiss banks or 
the Swiss tax authorities to monitor their foreign clients in tax matters. Swiss banks 
claim that it does not fall in their area of competence, which does not mean that the 
banks or the authorities would not cooperate with foreign authorities (see Chapters 
4.2 / 4.3). Referring to the Swiss Banking Association (SBA) about the self-declaration 
principle where every individual citizen has personal responsibility to follow their own 
tax liability towards the state and not its bank. The Swiss banks are not obliged to 
inform the state or the tax authorities about the amount of the interest which is credited 
to the clients bank account (cf. Perroulaz 2008: 127). So the banks and authorities 
escape the duty while putting the legal and moral responsibility on the individual itself. 
The cases of taxation between Switzerland and the EU have been intensively 
discussed. Foreign authorities have not hesitated to make use of any kind of option 
which could have damaged the reputation of the banking secrecy and thus the Swiss 
financial centre, such as not respecting Swiss sovereignty and banking secrecy laws 
by purchasing CDs with sensitive information (cf. Wittrock 2010). To evolve the 
situation Switzerland has recently agreed to revise or renew the tax agreements with 
Germany, Great Britain, Austria and is negotiating with Italy and France (see Chapter 
4.3.2). On the 15th of March 2012, over the negation period between Switzerland and 
Germany arrest warrants were issued by the public prosecutor‘s office of Switzerland 
against three tax officials in North Rhine-Westphalia which were involved in the 
purchase of a CD from the Swiss bank Credit Suisse  containing sensitive information 
of German clients and their undeclared assets. The Swiss prosecution office stated 
27
that the act of purchasing a CD with sensitive data is illegal since the CD itself violated 
banking secrecy laws. The German tax officials were accused of economic espionage 
against the bank Credit Suisse (cf. Tax Agreements II 2012). The dispute between 
Germany and other EU member states with Switzerland seems to be endless. Both 
parties are not willing to tolerate the banking secrecy laws or abandon the banking 
secrecy. It is questionable whether the campaign of the opposition of the banking 
secrecy actually wants to address tax issues or uses it as competition tool. With 
further tax agreements, which should come into force in January 2013, the situation 
among the two parties could be relieved for a given period.
4.4.3 Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation 
Another case which reflects badly on the Swiss banking sector and bank honesty is 
the  one concerning victims of the Holocaust and their assets. In 1996 and 1997 
numerous class action suits were filed in several United States federal courts against 
certain Swiss banks and other Swiss entities. The class action suits were filed by 
Holocaust survivors and descendants of the Holocaust victims. A judge of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward R. Korman 
consolidated all cases. The allegations stated that Swiss financial institution knowingly 
collaborated and aided the Nazi Regime by accepting illegally obtained assets 
allegedly of slave labour and retained or concealed assets of Holocaust victims. Swiss 
bankers had manipulated the banking secrecy to hide Nazi deposits of gold which 
was illegally obtained from the Holocaust victims. The allegations were a huge shock 
for the the Swiss government and Swiss banking sector, since it was viewed with huge 
respect. The Holocaust survivors were represented by various attorneys led by Burt 
Neuborne. The defendants were mainly financial institutions and the Swiss banks. The 
Swiss government was not included (cf. Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation 2012). The 
combination of the American legal suits and the threat of sanctions against Swiss 
financial institutions, led Switzerland to take legislative and compensatory action in 
dealing with the Holocaust victims as never before. During the litigation and settlement 
discussions the Swiss Parliament passed a law on the 13th of December 1996 to 
establish an Independent Commission of Experts – the Bergier Commission. The 
Commission‘s mandate was to investigate the amount, the way and origin of money 
and assets that found their way into Switzerland in connection with Nazi politics. 
Covering the period immediately after, during and prior to Second World War (cf. 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation 2012). In order to examine the issue all banks, 
insurance companies and other private entities had to disclose all their relevant 
information to the Bergier Commission. It signified that banking secrecy, the official 
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secrecy of the Swiss government and its courts and the professional secrecy of 
lawyers were suspended in order to successfully investigate for inactive bank 
accounts or dormant assets for the period of World War II (cf. Chaikin 2005: 103-104). 
The second formed Commission was The Volcker Committee, an independent 
Committee formed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the World Jewish 
Restitution Organisation, The World Jewish congress and the SBA in 1996. The 
Volcker Committee presented the final reports in the end of 1999. During the relevant 
period of 1933 till 1945, 6.8 million Swiss bank accounts were opened. Further, the 
Committee audited more than 300‘000 accounts. 53‘886 accounts had a possible or 
probable relationship to victims of Nazi prosecution. The Committee ranged the 
amount of mainly dormant assets with a possible connection to victims of Nazi 
prosecution from 643 million U.S. Dollars to 1.36 billion U.S Dollars (cf. Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litigation 2012). After all, the Committee could not find any clear 
evidence that Swiss financial institutes were active or connected in anyway of 
laundering or looting of assets. The Bergier Commission produced various reports. 
Main findings brought no evidence of looting or laundering. What the Commission was 
able to prove was that the Swiss National Bank (SNB) plaid a significant role in the 
handling of gold of the Reichsbank, contrary to commercial banks. Despite the fact 
that no evidence was found that the SNB was aware that the gold may have been 
looted from Nazi victims, the Commission criticised the SNB not acting in good faith. 
The parties reached an agreement to settle the lawsuits in August 1998. The 
agreement was signed on the 26th of January 1999 and concluded Swiss banks to 
pay 1.25 billion U.S. Dollar as a global settlement. The Swiss banks, the Swiss 
government and other entities on the other side were released and forever discharged 
from all claims relating World War II, Nazi Regime, Holocaust et cetera. Nevertheless, 
it caused a huge damage to the reputation of the banking sector and the prejudice of 
Swiss financial institutes being associated with Holocaust victims‘ assets remained (cf. 
Chaikin 2005: 105).
4.4.4 Emerging Nations & Developing Countries / Final Recommendations
A major problem in developing and transition countries is the fact that their 
governments are corrupted and the countries are governed undemocratically. Hence, 
the theft of public assets is a serious and huge problem. In developing and transition 
countries between 20-40 billion U.S. Dollars is associated with bribes received by 
public officials. Corrupt leaders illegally obtain money from their countries which 
usually is due to this capital not being reinvested into their own economy, further 
increasing these countries developmental status. It affects negatively public 
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Table 1: Source: World Justice Forum Foundation (WJF) (2009)
institutions, especially those involved in the public financial sector, it destroys the 
private investment climate, it weakens public health and education programmes and 
thus has the biggest impact on the poor. Those illegally obtained assets are often 
hidden in the world‘s financial centres (cf. World Justice Forum Foundation (WJF) 
2009: 9-11).
- Table 1 shows various political leaders and their amount of illegal assets. 
Some of those assets have been administered in Switzerland. In particular, 
money from Ferdinand Marcos, Sani Abacha or Jean-Claude Duvalier. The 
FINMA Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance allows business relationships with 
politically exposed persons (PEP). Problems arise if political events cause the 
PEP to become a personae non grata, in the eyes of the Swiss government of 
international authorities and organisations (cf. Swiss Bankers Association, 
Dictators’ assets 2012). It occurred numerous times that the Swiss 
government froze the assets of PEP‘s, the most recent cases with the Arab 
Spring movement. Assets of from the former Egypt and Libyan regime as well 
as the Syrian regime have been frozen. Switzerland has frozen CHF 1.217 
billion potentates‘ money in total in the year 2011. CHF 650 million concerning 
the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi. 410 Million Swiss francs come from the 
regime of the ceded, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and 60 million from 
the environment of the fallen, Tunisian President Ben Ali (cf. Dictators‘ assets 
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II 2012). It is then the task of Swiss authorities to restitute the frozen assets to 
the governments concerned (see Chapter 4.3.1). 
- Touching upon the moral aspect it is ethically highly questionable to manage 
such assets under the afore mentioned circumstances. The SBA claims that it 
is in the interest of the banks and the financial centre not being associated 
with potentates‘ money and thus not administer such assets in the first place. 
They add that the measures used to block these assets are globally 
accredited. At the same time it is argued that Switzerland is a haven for 
dictators’ assets cf. Swiss Bankers Association, Dictators’ assets 2012). 
- To finalise the ethical and moral aspects of the banking secrecy with its 
international disputes it can be stated that the list of ethical questions in the 
previously formulated conflicts are hard to be answered. Following points 
give a brief overview of the Swiss banking secrecy‘s moral grey areas or 
ethical aspects. Hence, the formulation of recommendations which may 
resolve ethical and moral aspects of the banking secrecy and its connected 
practices:
- It is the duty of every individual taxpayer to declare his income and assets in 
private area as well in business area;
- The individual countries and governments have to respect each other’s laws 
and regulations, as well as traditions in order to successfully cooperate
- The distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud can be seen as an artificial 
border. It encourages passive tax evasion, is discriminatory and is therefore 
highly problematic from an ethical point of view;
- It is ethically questionable if regulations and measures to reduce money 
laundering are used as in order to favour the image of the Swiss financial 
centre;
- On the other hand it is necessary to critically question whether the Swiss 
banking secrecy is used as a competition measure or as a pretext to harm 
the Swiss financial centre;
- It is not in the sense of the Swiss banking secrecy to use its practices for 
economic benefits such as profit maximisation or to the disadvantage of 
minorities or the less fortunate;
- Administration of assets of PEPs should be well considered and examined;
- Evaluation whether the existing self-regulation effectively is combating money 
laundering. If necessary, other instruments have to be implemented;
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- Protective measures against money laundering would be to accept only 
assets, which previously have been taxed. Hence, an elimination of the 
distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud;
- Important step with the EU would be extending the existing tax agreements. 
A next step could be the exchange of information between the legitimate 
authorities, so that tax justice and a fair tax competition can be achieved (cf. 
VBG Institut 2006: 16-17).
5. The Swiss Financial Centre
5.1 Facts & Figures
The Swiss financial centre is one of the most prestigious and among the leaders of the 
global market. The banking sector belongs to the world’s best and makes a significant 
contribution to gross value added in Switzerland and hence to the wealth of the whole 
Swiss population. The Swiss banks are financial institutions with a long tradition and 
history and are of high importance to the Swiss economy. The banks offer a wide 
range of qualified jobs. The tax contribution by the banks covers a significant part of 
the public expenses. In Switzerland, there are more than a third of all worldwide 
offshore assets are being administered. This figure is a proof for the international 
importance of the financial centre of Switzerland in the field of private banking. In the 
sector of wealth management Switzerland stands among the leaders. In a ranking of 
the worldwide largest wealth managers three Swiss banks are represented in the top 
ten. More than anywhere else in the world, banks are specialised in wealth 
management. (cf. Der Finanzplatz Schweiz und seine Bedeutung 2011: 1). 
Table 2 shows official statistics of the SNB and the SBA that in total CHF 5.5 billion are 
under Swiss management. With a market share of 27% in 2011, Swiss banks are in the 
leading position in the market of cross-border private banking. A value added of 
approximately CHF 8 billion is generated by 29,000 employees who work in the 
segment of wealth management for foreign clients. Wealth management is the core 
Table 2: Source: Calculations SBA, Swiss National Bank (2010)
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business of Swiss banks. It is important to note that a distinction between “Swiss 
banks“ which can be also subsidiaries in other countries and “banks in Switzerland“ 
which are actually geographically located in Switzerland must be made. According to 
the FINMA the term of “assets“ includes fiduciary deposits, securities held in client 
portfolios, amounts due to clients in savings and investment accounts and other 
amounts due to clients from time deposits. (cf. Der Finanzplatz Schweiz und seine 
Bedeutung 2011: 2-3).
5.7% of the whole Swiss work force is employed by the financial sector. 108‘000 work 
either for security dealers or banks; other 33‘900 are employed by other financial 
services. Insurance companies employ 53,145 and 104‘000 work for Swiss banks 
abroad in branches or subsidiaries. In total 320 banks are active in Switzerland which 
have 3‘726 branches. From those 284 branches are abroad. Table 4 shows that 10.7% 
of value added, meaning CHF 58.6 billion is accounted by the financial sector in 
Switzerland. If indirect effects are included the added value of the whole financial 
increases to an approximate of CHF 90 billion which is nearly one fifth of Switzerland‘s 
GDP. 6.7% of the Swiss GDP contributes the banking sector itself, the insurance 
sector 4%, CHF 21.9 billion. Employees of the financial sector account CHF 260‘000 
each of value added in Switzerland which is twice Swiss average (cf. Der Finanzplatz 
Schweiz und seine Bedeutung 2011: 1).
 
Table 3: Source: Swiss National Bank, Federal Statistical Office (2010)
Table 4: Source: Calculations SBA, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO (2010)
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The statistics and figures give a brief overview about the volumes of the financial 
centre in Switzerland and show the significance of the banks for the state and its 
economic wealth. The upcoming subchapter names factors for Switzerland becoming 
such an important and successful player on the global financial markets. The 
significance of the banking secrecy is highly disputed and has been displayed in this 
paper. The following focuses on other aspects and indicators, despite the arguable 
factor of the Swiss bank client confidentiality. Therefore studies will be taken into 
account.
5.2 Significance of the Swiss Financial Centre
Without a doubt is the intensive protection of the individual privacy by the banking 
secrecy a significant element for the success story of the Swiss banking centre. It is 
logical that the question arises whether the existence of the banking secrecy has been 
essential for the positive development of Switzerland becoming an international 
financial centre of high importance, especially for the success of the wealth 
management (cf. Vogler 2005: 55).
The study of Vogler (2005) analyses exactly the issue of the extent of the banking 
secrecy having a significant impact in the positive development of the Swiss financial 
centre. Therefore, he compares the different financial centres; he analyses the 
development of European financial centres and the United States, in particular the 
banking secrecies, international significance, banking laws and regulations, 
characteristics etc. Alphabetically ordered Belgium, Germany, France, Great Britain, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland, at that 
time Czechoslovakia and the United States are included in Vogler‘s research (cf. 
Vogler 55-59). His findings state that firstly, that “there is no universal model for the 
mechanism by which banking law, company law, etc., or banking secrecy can 
function as the foundation of a country’s development into a significant financial centre 
with a strong asset management sector“, secondly that “there is no evidence that 
banking secrecy is a fundamental or indispensable tool in the creation of a successful 
asset management business; traditional asset management for private individuals is a 
business that cannot be built on banking secrecy alone. Other elements have to 
provide the motivating force“ (cf. Vogler 2005: 55) (see Chapter 3.2).
Switzerland has been a traditional country exporting capital. This because till the 18th 
century the domestic demand for credit was small. As a result of international crisis‘, 
inflation, political instability, wars and monetary decay in foreign countries, Switzerland 
had a huge inflow of flight capital. The savings surplus and inflow of capital was at that 
time a bad basis for the international banking business as well as for the wealth 
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management. Switzerland did not have the intention nor the instruments to become a 
major financial centre. The Swiss economy was simply too small. With the recurrent 
political and economic problems in foreign countries people would invest in the Swiss 
Franc. It caused the Swiss Franc to become a strong and stable currency benefiting 
the financial centre and the Swiss economy. In the 20th century, the financial centre 
profited the most because of World War I, World War II, revolutions and inflation which 
most importantly occurred abroad. Switzerland was so politically stable that one could 
predict economic trends and conditions. Investors never had to fear unpleasant 
surprises. Additionally, Switzerland had the lowest inflation that assets in Swiss Francs 
would maintain their value. The Swiss Franc could always be converted, also for 
foreigners. With the transition to flexible exchange rates the Swiss Franc had 
appreciated strongly which made the currency even more popular and benefited the 
economy (cf. Schiltknecht 2008: 2-4). The economic and political crisis in Europe, 
generally the bad circumstances, especially in the neighbouring countries of 
Switzerland plaid a major role in the development of the Swiss financial centre in the 
20th century. Foreign non-existent factors which existed in Switzerland led to the 
increasing importance, reputation and trust in the Swiss financial institutions to this 
day.
As graph 1 shows is the success of the financial centre today dependent on various 
interconnected factors: 
- The political and macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite for the confidence 
and trust of the clients; the Swiss Franc impacts positively on the 
Graph 1: Source: EFV / Die Volkswirtschaft (2006)
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macroeconomic stability, since it is a strong international reserve- and 
diversification currency;
- The efficient financial infrastructure and strong global networking allow the 
market players to profitably manage their assets and risks to diversify them 
internationally;
- The Swiss financial centre enjoys foreign trust and has a high reputation 
hence is attractive for international clients and as business location. Despite 
the strong brands in the banking and insurance sector, high educational 
standards, multilingualism, service quality, a multicultural environment etc., 
the government regulation and supervisory bodies contribute to the success 
of the financial centre with strong measures combating terrorist financing or 
money laundering;
- in the matter of taxation, Switzerland is highly attractive in the international tax 
environment in virtue of the qualified and mobile workforce as well as the 
competitive taxation, the effective income tax rates between 16% and 25% 
(cf. Gerber et a. 2006: 4-5)
Because of the named factors the Swiss financial centre and its banking and 
insurance sector is ranked among the best in the world. Z/Yen Group published a 
study “The Global Financial Centres Index“ in March 2011 analysing the profiles of 75 
financial centres. With a representative survey of financial centre assessments, they 
defined different areas which are most significant for the competitiveness of a financial 
centre. These factors would be subject to the index itself. To those factors of 
competitiveness they separately analysed the criteria 
of reputation and stability.
Switzerland and its financial centres Zurich (8) 
respectively Geneva (9) ranked among the top ten on 
an international level. Looking at European financial 
centres Zurich was ranked second, Geneva third 
behind London (cf. The Global Financial Centres 
Index 9  2011: 4-5) In the cases of stability and 
reputation both Geneva and Zurich  were among the 
top fifteen financial centres in the world. Along with 
Singapore, Hong Kong, New York, London and 
Frankfurt the Swiss financial centres Geneva and 
Zurich were found most stable. In the case of 
reputation, Zurich ranked 8th while Geneva was 
ranked 11th (cf. The Global Financial Centres Index 9 Table 5: Source: Z/Yen Group (2011)
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2011: 29-30). The study concluded that the Swiss financial centre is the most 
balanced in Europe and remains attractive for foreign clients not only because of high 
reputation but also because of stable and sensible regulations (cf. The Global 
Financial Centres Index 9  2011: 15).
The World Economic Forum publishes every year the Global Competitiveness Report. 
Their department called “Centre for Global Competitiveness and Performance“ 
evaluates every year in cooperation with prestigious institutes all around the world, the 
competitiveness of the different economies in the world. The report divides the term 
“competitiveness“ into 12 pillars. These pillars are examined and finally brought 
together to be summarised in the index of competitiveness. Institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic environment, higher education and training, health and primary 
education, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market 
development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and 
innovation form the basis for the analysis (Graph 2).
 
Further the report puts the countries into five separate stages of development. The 
results of the report ranks Switzerland on the first place and thus considered most 
competitive. It characterises Switzerland for its very sophisticated business culture, 
excellent capacity for innovation, world-leading scientific research institutions, 
macroeconomic environment, independent judiciary, excellent infrastructure, highly 
developed financial and labour market strong, rule of law, and a highly accountable 
public sector. (cf. The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 2010: 14-15). 
Graph 2: Source: World Economic Forum (2010)
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International studies show that the Swiss financial centre and the Swiss economy are 
among the best and most important in the world and will continue to perform well. The 
reasons have been named. Nevertheless, the Swiss financial centre which is used to 
success, underwent various reputation crisis‘ for different reasons and was not able to 
escape the global economic crisis either (see Chapter 4.4). The bank client 
confidentiality in most cases has been the main issue, also in recent disputes with EU 
member states. The past has shown that the Swiss economy has highly benefited from 
the globalisation and opening of markets. As it is expected that Switzerland will be 
able benefit from it in the future, the Swiss government has to continue to revise 
regulations which protect the financial centre (cf. Roth 2008: 13). Regarding the tax 
issues and the banking secrecy the Swiss banks and the SBA stated not to acquire 
untaxed assets in the future, so called “strategies for legitimate money“. Results of the 
strategy would be the tax agreements with Germany, Great Britain and other EU 
member states. (cf. insight 1.12 2012: 6). In that way the issue of taxation with 
neighbouring countries as well as the EU body could be resolved without affecting the 
banking secrecy and fair competition guaranteed. 
6. Switzerland and the EU: Chronological Overview
- 22.07.1972: Signing of free trade agreement between the Switzerland and the EU;
- 02.05.1992: Signing of the EEA Agreement by the then 12 EU States and seven 
EFTA States;
- 26.05.1992: Switzerland sends a request to Brussels in order to enter the European 
Economic Area;
- 06.12.1992: The Swiss people reject to enter EEA Switzerland with a majority vote of 
50.3 %;
- 21.06.1999: Signing of the Bilateral I agreements;
- 21.05.2000: The Swiss people accept the Bilateral I agreements (67.2 %);
- 01.06.2002: Bilateral I agreements come into force;
- 26.10.2004: Signing of the Bilateral II agreements;
- 05.06.2005: The Swiss people accept the agreement to participate in Schengen/
Dublin with 56 %;
- 01.07.2005: The agreement on the taxation of savings income come into force
- 25.09.2005: The Swiss people accept the extension of the free movement of 
persons concerning the 10 new EU Member States (54 %);
- 01.03.2008: The Schengen/Dublin agreement come into force
- 12.12.2008: Start of operational implementation of Switzerland in the Schengen area 
(removal of checks on persons at the land borders);
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- 08.02.2009: The Swiss people accept the continuation of the free movement of 
persons (Bulgaria and Romania with 59.6 %);
- 29.03.2009: Removal of controls of people at airports within the framework of the 
Schengen/Dublin agreement (cf. Chronological Overview: Switzerland - EU: 2012)
- 18.04.2012: Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons Switzerland – EU: 
Invocation of the Safeguard Clause with respect to the EU-8 States (Safeguard 
Clause 2012)
- 15.05.2012: Concept of the revised tax agreement approved by the Economic 
Commission of the Council of States of Switzerland, important step for resolving tax 
issues (cf. Tax Agreements I 2012)
The relationship between the EU and Switzerland is considered a positive one. The 
major conflicts mostly occur among Switzerland and its neighbouring countries 
Germany, France and Italy. The main issue is taxation. Switzerland has shown various 
efforts to resolve the issue and has implemented different measures in order to 
cooperate with foreign authorities (See Chapter 4.3.2). Nevertheless Switzerland has 
remained the position not to abandon the banking secrecy and the bank client 
confidentiality (see Chapter 4.4.2). The question whether Switzerland should enter the 
European Union will not be answered in the near future. There is a strong force, 
basically the majority force in Switzerland which wants to remain as neutral country. 
Despite that, the recent Euro crisis and political instability of various European 
member states are factors which do not favour the possible decision of Switzerland 
entering the EU and the Eurozone. Although Switzerland is not a member of the 
European Union, it contributes to the European cohesion by supporting the different 
European fonds.
7. Hypotheses
- As mentioned in the beginning of this writing does the thesis follow a general 
questioning. However, four hypotheses can be outlined. The Hypotheses favour the 
banking secrecy. The construction of the hypotheses is based on the review of world 
literature as well as recent political and economic events in the environment of the 
Swiss financial centre and the Swiss banking secrecy.
- H1: The concept of Swiss bank client confidentiality is misinterpreted and observed 
in the wrong context – it is a Swiss tradition, a piece of Swiss culture.
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- H2: The banking secrecy is not respected by foreign authorities and their attempts to 
weaken it are violations of Swiss sovereignty.
- H3: The weakening of the Swiss banking secrecy by foreign authorities have had 
only short-term success, in the long term, the contrary dominates – the Swiss 
population, Swiss banks, as well as the government want to maintain and 
restrengthen the banking secrecy because of these attacks.
- H4: The banking secrecy is often used as a pretext – among other conditions, laws 
and regulations of the EU countries indirectly favour the Swiss financial centre.
8. Methodology
The previous chapters have touched upon the questioning of this thesis and have 
outlined different aspects from either the opposition of the Swiss banking secrecy or 
the parties in favour of the banking secrecy. It has been displayed what the main 
issues concerning the bank client confidentiality are and how the banking secrecy 
itself has been justified historically, politically and economicaly. In order to give a 
further input to the issue and test the hypotheses, an expert interview will be taken into 
account. The interview was held on the 28th of January 2012 at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos with an expert of the Swiss financial centre. The person who preferred 
not to be fully named, has great experience in the world of finances. After working in 
Zurich, Geneva, Hong Kong and Japan he was in the Executive Board of the Bank 
Leu, Credit Suisse, member of the Board of Directions in different companies and now 
CEO of a financial management company of which he is majority shareholder. The 
company is specialised in management, investment and consulting of assets of 
domestic and foreign clients in the European market. Along with the core statements 
of the interview, representative surveys contribute to the findings of the thesis are 
being used to test the hypotheses. It is concluded in Chapter 8.2 respectively in the 
conclusions. 
 
8.2 Discussion of the Results 
- H1: The concept of Swiss bank client confidentiality is misinterpreted and observed 
in the wrong context – it is a Swiss tradition, a piece of Swiss culture.
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Regarding H1 the interviewee states that the banking secrecy was never created with 
the intention to enable tax evasion, tax fraud or any other criminal activities. It was 
created to protect the privacy of the individual, the ideal of freedom; its protection is 
firmly anchored in the Swiss thinking and Swiss values. It is important to state that the 
Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance is one of the best in the world as well as the 
supervisory body FINMA. Additionally, the interviewee recollects the events of 9/11 
when Swiss specialists were asked for assistance by U.S. authorities to monitor cash 
flows of the al-Qaeda. The Swiss Attorney General concluded that in terms of 
monitoring money laundering the Swiss authorities are among the best where the U.S. 
still need a lot of development. The United States may have improved but there is no 
such thing as self-regulation measures, as known in Switzerland, which also explains 
the mortgage crisis. The procedure of opening an account in Switzerland is the same 
for more than 20 years. When a foreigner wants to open a Swiss account he has to 
declare the origin of his assets, he must be able to prove it with documents. The 
clients economic background is being questioned and his documents are then stored 
by the bank. The client has to sign a document that ensures that the claims made are 
truthful. PEPs have to answer further questions and provide extra documents. All 
clients have to sign a document that they are entitled to the assets or have to name 
the person which is entitled to the money. The expert adds that he is sure that Swiss 
banks have to follow most statutory obligations worldwide. Regarding taxes he states 
that it is Swiss thinking everyone being responsible for himself to pay taxes and thus it 
is not the task of Swiss authorities to act as “tax police“ for foreign country, the Swiss 
ideal of freedom is that above all. It is further interesting that Switzerland has high tax 
honesty; the country has low tax rates and high quality of life – a normal human being 
would not come up with the idea to evade taxes in such an environment (cf. Interview 
regarding the Swiss Banking Secrecy 2012).
It can be argued that the Swiss banking secrecy and its projection in the movies and 
the media is often in connection with criminal activity. Therefore, it can be doubted that 
general public, as well as policy makers of the opposition of the banking secrecy have 
a broad knowledge about the creation and implementation of the Swiss banking 
secrecy. The bank client confidentiality existed long ago before the actual 
implementation into Swiss law. The bank client confidentiality how it actually should be 
named, is a professional secrecy known also from other professions, such as doctors 
or lawyers. The reasons for its implementation were certainly not to enable tax evasion 
or other criminal activities. The banking secrecy itself was only one article (Article 47) 
of the Federal Banking Act which was implemented in virtue of the crisis which 
affected badly the Swiss financial centre. The banking secrecy as we know it today is 
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a construct of different laws to protect the individual and its privacy and has been a 
Swiss cultural tradition and trademark over more than a century (see Chapters 3, 4.2).
- H2: The banking secrecy is not respected by foreign authorities and their attempts to 
weaken it are violations of Swiss sovereignty.
It is most certain that the banking secrecy laws are not compatible with EU 
regulations, especially not with policies of Switzerland‘s neighbouring countries 
Germany, France and Italy. Nevertheless, those laws are implemented in Swiss 
legislation. Switzerland is a neutral and sovereign state and thus from a legal 
perspective, the banking secrecy laws have to be seen as absolute by the EU and its 
member states. The attempts from EU member state Germany to buy CDs with 
sensitive information violates Swiss law. The expert claims in the interview that the 
actions of the EU, especially of Germany are highly questionable and can not be 
tolerated. In his personal opinion it is a criminal act. Talking of the weakening of the 
banking secrecy, he affirms that the banking secrecy has been weakened and will 
become less important in the matter of taxation. However, domestic and foreign media 
barely reports about the assistance Swiss authorities have provided over the past 
years in cases of tax fraud and even tax evasion. Concerning data privacy the 
banking secrecy will remain and automatic exchange of information is not expected. 
(cf. Interview regarding the Swiss Banking Secrecy 2012). German tax law expert 
Moris Lehner explains that it is questionable whether a democratic state is allowed to 
buy such information which was illegally purchased in the first place. On the one hand 
it is important for the state to collect the taxes which it deserves on the other hand 
should the state no use instruments which go on a criminal level themselves. So with a 
purchase of such a CD Germany would encourage the act of denunciation. Lehner 
adds that in his opinion German courts will allow to use such CDs as evidence. 
Generally, it would cast a very dark shadow over the German state (Lehner 2010: 2-3). 
Switzerland see such attempts as a violation of their law, which resulted in the issuing 
of arrest warrants against German officials which were accused to buy such CDs with 
sensitive information (see Chapter. 4.4.2). Legally speaking, the attempts violate Swiss 
law and thus can not be tolerated, since Switzerland is a sovereign state and has 
various agreements with the EU and thus Germany. On the other side it can be argued 
that German authorities use all possible means to collect taxes which they deserve 
from German citizens who are breaking the law in the first place. Various agreements 
have been implemented already for mutual assistance in tax matters, further 
agreements are expected. Hence, H2 can neither be falsified nor confirmed.
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- H3: The weakening of the Swiss banking secrecy by foreign authorities have had 
only short-term success, in the long term, the contrary dominates – the Swiss 
population, Swiss banks, as well as the government want to maintain and 
restrengthen the banking secrecy because of these attacks.
The interviewee clearly indicates that there is a strong political force (the majority of 
Swiss political parties) which wants to protect and keep the banking secrecy from 
being broken. The conservative forces in favour of the banking secrecy become more 
popular in virtue of the attacks. As well as the Swiss banks and SBA want to keep the 
banking secrecy. Touching upon the effects, it can be said that the Swiss financial 
centre will become less important. The attacks are direct attempts to harm the Swiss 
financial centre. The Swiss financial centre is a direct competitor of New York, London 
and Frankfurt and the respective states are concerned with serious debt problems 
either in their own country or in the EU. So it is also a tool to create a competitive 
advantage. It can be seen that foreign clients are uncertain, but the expert is sure that 
if legal security maintains and the decision makers communicate in clear ways, the 
future will bring an inflow of declared assets (cf. Interview regarding the Swiss 
Banking Secrecy 2012). So from an economic perspective the attacks had negative 
effects, referring to the UBS case and the Euro crisis (see Chapter 4.4.1). Politically as 
mentioned it can be said that banking commissions and associations along with the 
government do not see abandoning the Swiss banking secrecy as an option. The 
Swiss financial centre was not created from one day to another – it was a long process 
and in the world of finance there are certain factors which are of highest importance 
such as trust, legal and economic security, political stability, professionalism etc. (see 
Chapter 5.2). Switzerland‘s financial sector, its financial institutions and the country 
itself possessed those characteristics over decades and thus positive reputation was 
created. This reputation is the centre piece of the Swiss financial centre, once 
reputation is lost it is hard to regain it. That is why Swiss authorities and banks want to 
restrengthen and keep the banking secrecy, since it is an intrinsic part of Swiss 
culture. The public opinion affirms that. The representative study of the SBA in 2011 
evaluated the public opinion of Swiss people concerning the Swiss banking secrecy. 
The representative survey shows that Swiss people have the opinion almost without 
exception that the financial privacy must be guaranteed and preserved from third 
parties (91%, in comparison to 2010: 89%)  Only 7% are support the opposite. 
Concerning the bank client confidentiality 73% want to keep it, while 22 % want to 
abolish it (cf. Aktuelle Bankenfragen 2011 Meinungen und Vorstellungen der 
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Schweizer Bürger 2011: 37-41). Looking at the performance of the banks it can be 
seen in Chart 3 that because of the global economic crisis the performance of the the 
Swiss Private Banking Index lost significant points. As well looking at the UBS affair it 
can be seen that the curve stagnates. Nevertheless, in comparison with the other 
indexes Swiss banks respectively the Swiss Private Bank Index which includes the 
major banks UBS and Credit Suisse did not under perform. The curves of the MSCI 
Europe Banks as well as the MSCI World Banks the curves run similar to each other. 
Thus from an economic point of view it can be argued that the Swiss banks were not 
significantly affected, by the attacks of foreign authorities (cf. Birchler et al. 2011: 
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- H4: The banking secrecy is often used as a pretext – among other conditions, laws 
and regulations of the EU countries indirectly favour the Swiss financial centre.
The expert claims that it is definitely true that neighbouring countries of Switzerland 
follow a tax policy which favour tax evasion. Talking of Germany which has an income 
tax rate of 50%. Switzerland is among the countries in Europe with the lowest tax 
rates. It is the understanding in Switzerland that the states provides certain regulations 
which contribute to the quality of life. The taxation policy is such a regulation, better 
said policy which attracts foreigners. With signing the Schengen/Dublin agreements, 
free movement of labour and people was possible. Hence, foreigners wanted to profit 
from the Swiss regulations, high wages, political and economic stability. Despite that, 
it is true that the competition on the global market has become tougher. The individual 
market players use questionable measures to create competitive advantage, since the 
Graph 2: Source: Bloomberg / Datastream (2011)
44
Swiss financial centre is a direct competitor of the European financial centres. So there 
are certain policy makers and lobbyists which try to damage the reputation of the 
Swiss financial centre, especially the media does often not portray the objectively. 
Certainly, tax evasion was facilitated by the Swiss banking secrecy but this also 
means that its policies were misused. From a historical point of view, European 
countries suffered from political uncertainties over the decades. Due to the First World 
war as well as due to the Second World War European citizens had lost all their 
savings and assets. This fear somehow remained. The expert states that from 
personal experience with his clients from Germany, Italy or France he senses the fear 
that they would lose their savings once more in virtue of the Euro crisis, which is 
unlikely (cf. Interview regarding the Swiss Banking Secrecy 2012). To summarise, 
there is no doubt that due to economical crisis‘ the competition among the financial 
centres becomes more intense. Therefore all kinds of instruments are used in order to 
acquire clients or damage the reputation of competitors. Chapters 4.3.2 and 4.4.2 
explain the contradictory and complex sides of H4, hence the hypotheses can neither 
be confirmed nor falsified. 
9. Conclusions
The Swiss banking secrecy and the bank client confidentiality have been existing for 
more than a hundred years. It has been under criticism since its existence and 
implementation into constitutional law in 1935. Various myths and falsehoods exist 
about the Swiss banking secrecy. History shows why the Swiss financial sector has 
become one of the most competitive and prestigious in the world. The Swiss financial 
centre was able to remain its position among the best, despite undergoing economic 
crisis‘, being repeatedly attacked by foreign authorities and suffering loss of 
reputation. Various factors such as, trust, professionalism, political stability, legal 
security were improved over the decades, thus have raised the overall reputation of 
the Swiss financial sector. The most controversial factor for its success is without a 
doubt the banking secrecy. The banking secrecy is often misinterpret plus the 
knowledge about the reasons of its creation and implementation is often lacking. Due 
to movies and the media as well as international accusations, the Swiss banking 
secrecy and thus the Swiss financial centre are often facing prejudices. Switzerland is 
often portrayed as a rogue country. The Swiss banking secrecy has been considered 
a tool for criminal activity and tax evasion. The EU, especially Switzerland‘s 
neighbouring countries Italy, Germany and France want the Swiss government to 
abandon the Swiss banking secrecy laws and therefore attempted to harm it with more 
or less success. Concerning the questioning of the thesis about the future of Swiss 
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banking, the impact of the relationship between the EU and Switzerland on the 
banking secrecy, the conclusions can be made from an interconnected political and 
economic point of view. Talking of political aspects, it can be stated that Switzerland 
will remain its position and keep its policies concerning the banking secrecy. Due to 
cooperation and signing of agreements with the European Union, Switzerland 
guarantees mutual assistance in criminal matters. Nevertheless, no agreements so far 
had an actual affect on the Swiss banking secrecy. Switzerland does not see the 
automatic exchange of sensitive information as an option. This because of the Swiss 
thinking of protecting the individual privacy – the banking secrecy represents Swiss 
culture – the idea of freedom. Switzerland does not tolerate criminal actions such as 
money laundering or tax fraud and thus will continue to provide mutual assistance in 
exchanging information with foreign authorities. This only if the claims are well 
documented and indicate criminal action. Otherwise it is of high importance to avoid, 
better said not tolerate “fishing expeditions“. If the recent agreements revising the 
existing tax agreements pass through the different parliaments the issue of tax evasion 
can be resolved and the bank client confidentiality would remain and not be affected. 
Various EU member states see the Swiss banking secrecy as a competitive advantage 
and portray it as a harm to their own financial centres and the state itself. To 
summarise the political aspects; the issue of the Swiss banking secrecy can be 
resolved with the revised tax agreements, at least for a given time. The intentions of 
the banking secrecy, claim the Swiss, are only positive and benefit the individual 
freedom and privacy. The EU authorities remain in the position against the Swiss 
banking secrecy. Touching upon the economic aspects, it can be stated that there is 
no doubt that the Swiss banking secrecy has favoured tax evasion and thus given the 
Swiss financial sector an immense economic boost over the years. The attempts to 
weaken the banking secrecy have been successful and therefore major Swiss banks 
had to disclose sensitive information and pay fines to foreign authorities. Swiss banks 
and the Swiss Bankers Association have just recently stated that they will follow a 
strategy for legitimate money. The future will show whether the Swiss financial sector, 
its financial institutions, banks and insurances will be able to remain among the world 
leaders – a time of change has come to the Swiss financial centre and the Swiss 
banking sector. 
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